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SUBCLASSING
Scott Dodson*
ABSTRACT
This Article is the first to take a hard look at Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(c)(4)(B), an oft-slighted part of the class action scheme
that permits a court to create subclasses “when appropriate.” Despite
its tautologically unhelpful text, no other court or commentator has
undertaken a comprehensive analysis of this provision. The time to do
so is certainly now. As class actions grow bigger, plaintiffs seek new
ways to meet Rule 23’s certification requirements. Just in the last few
years, plaintiffs have turned to subclassing’s sister provision, Rule
23(c)(4)(A), which has consequently received a flurry of commentary
from courts and academics. The subclassing provision, which provides
an alternative mechanism to Rule 23(c)(4)(A), is therefore ripe for a
similar spate of commentary and conflict. This Article sets the stage for
that discussion by formulating two conflicting theories of subclassing:
the replacement theory, which posits that subclasses can be certified
without regard to the certifiability of the global class action, and the
contingency theory, which requires any subclass to be a part of a
certified global class. Testing these interpretations of Rule 23(c)(4)(B)
against the traditional tools of statutory interpretation—text, context,
structure, drafting history, precedent, and functionality—this Article
concludes that the replacement theory is the best interpretation of the
subclassing provision. Nevertheless, this Article notes the arguments to
the contrary and suggests that they serve as a call to the Rules
Committee and the Court to clarify the meaning and scope of the
subclassing provision.
INTRODUCTION
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs class
actions in federal court. Overshadowed by the powerhouse certification
provisions of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3), is the oft-overlooked
subclassing provision of Rule 23(c)(4)(B), which states: “When
appropriate . . . a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass
treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed
and applied accordingly.”1 That is all the textual guidance the Federal
Rules provide on the subject of subclasses, and its meaning is far from
*
1

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law (effective Fall, 2006).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(B).
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clear. How does Rule 23(c)(4) relate to the certifiability of a class?
When, indeed, is it appropriate to subclass? The Rule’s tautological
answer is no answer at all, and the interrelationships between Rule
23(c)(4) and Rules 23(a) and (b) are unclear.
The text has remained unchanged since 1966. Despite its age, no
one has given Rule 23(c)(4)(B) the treatment it deserves. A few courts
have staked out different positions on the proper role of subclasses in
certification decisions, but their reasoning is sparse and superficial at
best.2 The Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue, though it has
danced around it several times in the last few years.3 Congress, too,
missed a golden opportunity to clarify the meaning of the subclassing
provision when it passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, but,
unfortunately, that act does not deal with subclassing at all.4 No other
scholar has taken up this subject to give Rule 23(c)(4)(B) the attention it
is due.5 Thus, the questions regarding the proper role of subclasses in
certification decisions remain unanswered.
The time to answer them has come. Class actions are becoming
increasingly larger. As the classes become bigger, the stakes become
higher, for the proverbial eggs are all in one basket. The question of
class certification in these massive class actions becomes the critical
issue, often leading to either settlement or dismissal. With the weight of
the suit riding on certification, class plaintiffs are finding creative ways
to argue in favor of certification. One of those ways is the use of the
2
3
4
5

See infra text accompanying notes 110-129.
See infra text accompanying notes 59-109.
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
See Michael P. Malakoff & Erin M. Brady, Taming the Uncommon Issues: What Role
Should Subclasses Play in Rule 23(b)(3) Certification?, 772 PRACTISING L. INST.: CONSUMER
FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 329 (1998) (arguing that subclassing cannot be a substitute for
global class certification, but failing to address the textual support for the contrary interpretation);
Susan Bisom-Rapp, Comment, The Use of Subclasses in Class Action Suits Under Title VII, 9
INDUS. REL. L.J. 116 (1987) (arguing that subclasses can replace a global, uncertifiable class
based on the liberal policy of using the class mechanism to vindicate individual rights, but failing
to address the contrary indications of the structure of Rule 23); Note, Certifying Classes and
Subclasses in Title VII Suits, 99 HARV. L. REV. 619 (1986) (touching upon subclass certification,
but not addressing whether subclasses may be certified if a global class cannot be). The three
most prominent treatises on civil procedure take a broad view of the use of subclasses to solve
commonality or predominance problems that may prevent certification in a global class, though
they do not offer justification for their position. See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1778, at 546 (2d ed. 1986) (suggesting that subclassing
could make the common issues in the subdivided class action predominate for the purposes of
Rule 23(b)(3)); 8 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §
24:24, at 145 (4th ed. 2002) (“Bifurcation or the creation of subclasses may circumvent
commonality problems.”); 5 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.23[3], at
23-76 (3d ed. 2005) (“Similarly, if common questions do not exist among members of the class as
proposed, Rule 23(c)(4) permits a court to create subclasses . . . in order to satisfy the
commonality requirement.”). In short, no one has yet proffered the results of a comprehensive
analysis of Rule 23(c)(4)(B).
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“issue class” of Rule 23(c)(4)(A), which states that an action may be
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.6 The
propriety of certifying “issue classes” as a way of avoiding certification
of the global class has arisen relatively recently, and already some
commentary has developed.7 Although courts have addressed the
issue,8 as of yet there is no consensus on the proper role of “issue
classes.”
A different method is the use of Rule 23(c)(4)(A)’s sister
provision, the subclass mechanism of Rule 23(b)(4)(B), to bypass
certification of a global class that cannot meet the certification
requirements. Whether this is a proper use of subclassing is an issue
that has been bubbling just beneath the surface. Unlike the issue class
provision, however, far fewer scholars and courts have taken a hard
look at the use of the subclassing provision for purposes of certifying an
otherwise uncertifiable global class.
This Article takes up that challenge. Part I provides background
on the purpose and text of Rule 23, critical to understanding the
certification standards and how the subclass provision fits into the class
action scheme. Part II explains the trend towards large class actions, the
problems they cause for certification, and the potential solution of
subclasses.
Part III begins the interpretative process by identifying two
conflicting theories of the proper role of subclasses: the “contingency
theory,” which states that certification of subclasses is contingent on
certification of the global class, and the “replacement theory,” which
states that certification of subclasses can replace the global class and
obviate the need for its certification.

6 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(A) (“When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues . . . .”).
7 The commentary is not in agreement. Compare Laura J. Hines, The Dangerous Allure of
the Issue Class Action, 79 IND. L.J. 567 (2004) [hereinafter Hines, Dangerous Allure] (arguing
that before an issue class may be certified, the entire class must be certifiable), and Laura J.
Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709 (2003) [hereinafter
Hines, End-Run] (same), and David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 955 (1998) (agreeing that Rule 23(b)(3) overrides issue certification
unless those issues do “predominate” over the individual issues in the case), with MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.17 (1995) (supporting the opposite), and NEWBERG, supra
note 5, §§ 4:23, 4.24 (same), and 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 1790 (same), and Elizabeth
J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475, 1499-506 (2005)
(urging greater use of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) to certify issue classes), with Robert G. Bone, Rule 23
Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14 REV. LITIG. 79, 95-96 (1994) (same), and Jon
Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of Particular
Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 263 (“[C]ases that do not otherwise meet
the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) can be certified as issue
classes.”).
8 See infra text accompanying notes 146-167.
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Part IV demonstrates that the traditional tools for interpretation
suggest that the replacement theory is the proper interpretation of Rule
23(c)(4)(B). Although the drafting history of the provision is
inconclusive, the commentary is inconsistent, and the few judicial
pronouncements available provide only unreasoned conclusions, the
text of Rule 23(c)(4)(B) supports the replacement theory, and the
prevailing interpretation of its sister provision, Rule 23(c)(4)(A),
provides additional support. There are certainly counterarguments—the
most prominent being the structural argument that the subclassing
provision resides within the manageability section rather than the
certification sections—but these arguments do not, in my opinion,
outgun the textual support for the replacement theory.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The Purpose and Benefits of Class Actions

The plaintiff class action suit is a single-action litigation of
multiple claims in a representative capacity. Essentially, one or a few
named parties bring suit on behalf of all similarly situated plaintiffs.
The unnamed plaintiffs need not participate in the suit, though they are
bound—unless they opt out—by any merits decision for or against the
class.9
This mechanism serves at least four purposes.10 First, it promotes
judicial economy by consolidating multiple but similar claims into one
to litigate the common elements simultaneously.11 Second, it provides a
forum for redress of small claims that are too expensive to pursue
individually.12 Third, it cuts costs for both plaintiffs and defendants.
For plaintiffs, the costs of pursuing the litigation are spread among all
9
10

See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1992).
There are others. Class actions protect plaintiffs against a race to the courtroom against
defendants with limited funds. They also prevent the defendant from picking a particularly weak
individual action to litigate to get a favorable decision, which it can then use to collaterally estop
subsequent individual actions.
11 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 (1982).
12 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (“Class actions permit the
plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.”). The Supreme
Court has gone so far as to suggest that this is a core justification for class actions. See Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109
F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)):
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem
that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo
action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating
the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an
attorney’s) labor.
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plaintiffs and common issues are only litigated once.13 For defendants,
large numbers of potential lawsuits are consolidated into one
proceeding, thereby eliminating duplicative litigation. Fourth, class
actions prevent the inequity of separate adjudications resulting in
inconsistent results by, for example, imposing conflicting standards on a
single defendant.14
The principal downside is that the class action suit is a
representative suit, despite the general rule that litigation be conducted
by named parties only,15 which sacrifices some individual autonomy
over one’s own claims and risks inadequate or unfair representation.16
Indeed, class members who are not class representatives have no right
to interfere in the litigation. Under certain circumstances, individual
class members may be able to “opt out” of the class,17 but they cannot
direct the case without becoming representatives. As Judge Posner has
stated, this kind of representative suit can lead to unfairness or even
abuse:
The class action is an awkward device, requiring careful judicial
supervision, because the fate of the class members is to a
considerable extent in the hands of a single plaintiff (or handful of
plaintiffs . . .) whom the other members of the class may not know
and who may not be able or willing to be an adequate fiduciary of
their interests. Often the class representative has a merely nominal
stake . . . , and the real plaintiff in interest is then the lawyer for the
class, who may have interests that diverge from those of the class
members. The lawyer for the class is not hired by the members of
the class and his fee will be determined by the court rather than by
contract with paying clients. The cases have remarked the danger
that the lawyer will sell out the class in exchange for the defendant’s
tacit agreement not to challenge the lawyer’s fee request. . . . Rule
23 tries to minimize the potential abuses of the class action device in
two principal ways, first by insisting that the class be reasonably
homogeneous, . . . and second by insisting that the class
representative be shown to be an adequate representative of the
class.18

13
14
15
16
17

U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402-03 (1980).
Id.
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 155.
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (stating that “the court will exclude from the class any
member who requests exclusion”).
18 Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.); accord
Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 n.9 (3d Cir. 1973) (“Experience teaches that
it is counsel for the class representative and not the named parties, who direct and manage these
actions. Every experienced federal judge knows that any statements to the contrary is [sic] sheer
sophistry.”).
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Another downside is that class actions create their own
inefficiencies that can counteract the efficiencies of consolidation that
the class mechanism normally encourages. For example, the larger the
class scope, the higher the stakes for class certification. Thus, the
certification decision in massive class actions is often the most
contentious phase of the litigation. For such expansive classes,
certification is more difficult as well because wider differences among a
broad group tend to minimize the commonality uniting the members, a
prerequisite to certification. As a result, more time and money may be
spent on the procedural hurdle of certification than on the merits. In
addition, simple management of the due process concerns of the class,
such as notification, present their own difficulties. In a products
liability class involving millions of purchasers, for example,
identification of potential class members alone may be a near
impossible feat, and the mailing costs of notices may be costprohibitive.19 The end result of this downside is excessive delay of
relief for individual class members20 and unnecessarily high transaction
costs associated with managing the class and litigation. These
downsides cut against the salutary benefits of the class mechanism.
B.

Structure of Rule 23

The structure of Rule 23 reflects the drafters’ intent to maximize
the salutary benefits of the class mechanism while minimizing its
detractions. The crux of Rule 23 is to ensure that “maintenance of a
class action is economical and the named plaintiffs’ claim and the class
claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be
fairly and adequately protected in their absence.”21
Rule 23(a), entitled “Prerequisites to a Class Action,” states that
“[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of [the others] only if” the four prerequisites of
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy are met.22
Numerosity is met when the class is “so numerous that joinder of
all members is impractical.”23 This prerequisite demonstrates the
drafters’ recognition that, when practical, the joinder of the plaintiffs is
19 See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747 (5th Cir. 1996) (identifying the cost of
providing “notice to millions of class members” as contributing to the “extensive manageability
problems” of class certification).
20 See David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons From a
Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695, 710 (1989).
21 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982).
22 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
23 Id. at R. 23(a)(1).
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preferable to class actions because each joined claimant has separate
counsel and independent control over his own claims. The numerosity
requirement sets a baseline criterion below which representative suits
are not justified in light of the alternatives.
Commonality is met when “there are questions of law or fact
common to the class.”24 This prerequisite ensures that at least some
minimal level of commonality unites the class so that a class-wide
determination on the common issues can fairly resolve those issues for
each class member. Without at least one common issue, class resolution
is simply too cumbersome to be productive.
Typicality is met when “the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class.”25 This prerequisite ensures that the claims of the named
representatives are sufficiently similar to the claims of the other class
members to justify possible representation of class claims by proxy.
Similarly, adequacy is met when “the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”26 This
prerequisite is broader than typicality and focuses not only on whether
the interests of the named representatives and the other class members
are aligned, but also on the quality of the named representatives. If a
named representative is inadequate to represent the class, because, for
example, he has some conflict of interest or incapacitation, he is not an
adequate representative even if his claims are typical of the class claims.
If these baseline “prerequisites” of Rule 23(a) are met, then the
action may have sufficient benefits and minimal detractions to qualify
for class action treatment. That Rule 23(a) is satisfied, however, does
not mean that the class should be certified as a class action.27 Rule
23(a) only sets the baseline qualifications. Rule 23 imposes additional
conditions for the class to be “maintained” as a class action to ensure
that the class action is the best method for resolving the disputes.28
Under the first condition, Rule 23(b)(1), a class may be certified if
the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications
establishing incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing
the class or (B) adjudications which would be dispositive of the interests
of other members not parties to the adjudications.29 Rule 23(b)(1)
24
25
26
27

Id. at R. 23(a)(2).
Id. at R. 23(a)(3).
Id. at R. 23(a)(4).
Id. at R. 23(a), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendments (stating that Rule 23(a)’s
prerequisites are “necessary but not sufficient conditions for a class action”).
28 Id. at R. 23(b).
29 Id. at R. 23(b)(1); see also id. at R. 23(b)(1), advisory committee’s notes to 1966
amendment.
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describes one of the “natural” class actions: when individual actions
would create incompatible standards for the defendant to follow or
would threaten the ability of the plaintiffs to protect their own
interests.30 In these instances, a class action is a necessary joinder
device to prevent the injustices that would result from separate
litigation.31
Under the second condition, a Rule 23(b)(2) class may be certified
if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole.”32 This section is most useful—and most used—in the
civil rights field, in which the defendant’s conduct affects classes of
people in the same way.33 Although the class mechanism is not as
necessary in this context as it is in the Rule 23(b)(1) context, it logically
lends itself to Rule 23(b)(2) classes, particularly discrimination classes,
for, as the Supreme Court has stated, discrimination is, by definition,
class-based.34
The last condition, Rule 23(b)(3), is a catchall, discretionary
aggregation device for cases that do not inherently lend themselves to
class treatment but nevertheless may be adjudicated on a class basis if
efficiency is furthered and adequate representation is secured.35 Rule
23(b)(3) allows for certification when “the court finds that the questions
of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.”36 Matters “pertinent” to the Rule
23(b)(3) “predominace” and “superiority” determination include (A) the
members’ interest in individually controlling their own actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
30 See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 388 (1967); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(1), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment (“The difficulties which would be
likely to arise if resort were had to separate actions . . . here furnish the reasons for, and the
principal key to, the propriety and value of utilizing the class-action device.”).
31 See Hines, Dangerous Allure, supra note 7, at 590.
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
33 See Kaplan, supra note 30, at 389; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2), advisory committee’s
notes to 1966 amendment (stating this provision includes “various actions in the civil-rights field
where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class”).
34 See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982).
35 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment (stating that
Rule 23(b)(3) “encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of
time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated,
without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results”); Kaplan,
supra note 30, at 389-90.
36 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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commenced by or against the members; (C) the desirability of
concentrating the litigation in the particular forum; and (D) the
difficulties of management.37
The predominance determination “tests whether proposed classes
are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.”38
The predominance factor is akin to a “supercommonality” requirement:
it is met when significant legal issues are common to each class
member’s cause of action or to the defense of such claims.39
Predominance has both quantitative components (how many questions
are common to the class) and qualitative components (are the common
questions the major questions at issue). Implicit in predominance is the
notion that the more commonality, the more economical and efficient
the class action40 and the more likely that the class has sufficient
cohesion to justify representative litigation.41
“That common questions predominate,” however, “is not itself
sufficient to justify a class action under subdivision (b)(3), for another
method of handling the litigious situation may be available which has
greater practical advantages.”42 The superiority requirement operates as
an open-ended test to determine if the class mechanism is the superior
factor, when compared to available alternatives. Alternatives include
test or model actions and consolidation.43 One common application of
the superiority analysis is in negative value claims, which are too lowvalue for most claimants to litigate separately given the costs of
litigation but which are viable in the class mechanism, which spreads
and economizes the costs.44 It also takes on some predominance
character, for if too many individualized issues exist, the class
mechanism is not likely to be particularly efficient or manageable.45
Essentially, Rule 23(b)(3) is a heightened Rule 23(a) standard.
Together, they ensure both that the baseline prerequisites for
certification are met and that additional levels of protection for the
37
38
39

Id. at R. 23(b)(3).
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).
Id. (explaining that predominance “trains on the legal or factual questions that qualify each
class member’s case as a genuine controversy”); see also Romberg, supra note 7, at 287-88.
40 Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001); FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendments (“It is only where this predominance
exists that economies can be achieved by means of the class-action device.”).
41 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623.
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
43 Id.
44 In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 287 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Kaplan, supra
note 30, at 391. Representative litigation of negative value claims is also less likely to implicate
due process concerns because individual class members are more likely to consent to such
litigation rather than pursue it themselves. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of
Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 394 (2001).
45 See Kaplan, supra note 30, at 393.
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parties and levels of efficiency and economy actually justify class
treatment.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF CERTIFICATION
In many cases, class actions are a plaintiff’s weapon. Class
certification can aggregate weak claims with strong ones and mask the
weak claims in a numbers game.46 Certification also presents the risk of
an all-or-nothing verdict, which defendants are likely to avoid by
settling quickly.47 Coupled with courts’ early predisposition for class
certification as a way to vindicate individual rights,48 the class
mechanism has become a formidable weapon for plaintiffs.
These natural litigation pressures have caused class actions to
increase in size.49 As long as a class action will be maintained, it is in
both parties’ interests, generally speaking, to pack as many claimants
into the class as possible. For defendants, such a scope means resolving
all of the potential individual claims at once, although defendants may
attempt to narrow the class to exclude those members whose claims are
unlikely to succeed individually. For plaintiffs, a larger class means
46 See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Class certification
magnifies and strengthens the number of unmeritorious claims.”).
47 See id. (“The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a risk, even when the
probability of an adverse judgment is low.”); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,
1298-300 (7th Cir. 1995); Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 958 (1995). For this reason, some have denigrated certain class
certifications as judicial blackmail. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 746; In re GM Corp. Pick-Up Truck
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784-85 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Another problem is that class
actions create the opportunity for a kind of legalized blackmail: a greedy and unscrupulous
plaintiff might use the threat of a large class action, which can be costly to the defendant, to
extract a settlement far in excess of the individual claims’ actual worth.”); Rhone-Poulenc, 51
F.3d at 1299-300; HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973).
Other courts have recognized that the “[m]ere pressure to settle is not a sufficient reason for a
court to avoid certifying an otherwise meritorious class action suit.” Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382
F.3d 1241, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004); In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124,
145 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The effect of certification on parties’ leverage in settlement negotiations is a
fact of life for class action litigants. While the sheer size of the class in this case may enhance
this effect, this alone cannot defeat an otherwise proper certification.”).
48 Hines, Dangerous Allure, supra note 7, at 576 (stating that “courts soon after the Rule 23
amendment began resorting to the class action rule to help manage the growing number of mass
tort cases”); Hines, End-Run, supra note 7, at 709; 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 1754, at
56-58. Particularly in the civil rights arena, courts were quick to use class actions as a vehicle for
enhancing substantive rights, until the Supreme Court reminded the courts that Rule 23 was there
for a reason. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
49 In recent years, some of the largest classes for their respective claims have been certified.
See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) (certifying a class of over 600,000
physicians in one of the largest commercial non-securities litigations); Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 222 F.R.D. 189 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (certifying a class of over 1.6 million Wal-Mart employees
in the largest ever employment discrimination class action).
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less pro rata cost to each individual, a higher award upon a successful
judgment (a driving incentive for counsel), and increased pressure on
the defendant to settle. Even the court has an interest: it must either
certify a massive class or face an unmanageable inundation of
individual cases asserting the same general claims.50
As bigger and bigger classes are crammed into the Rule 23 model,
the class requirements become more and more difficult to meet.
Representatives’ claims are less likely to be typical of other class
members’ claims. Representatives are also less likely to be able to
adequately represent so many different class members. For Rule
23(b)(2) classes, a defendant’s conduct is less likely to have affected a
broad class in the same way that it has a narrow class.
Rule 23(b)(3) classes, particularly mass torts, have the most
difficulty with broad class actions because the influx of disparate
individual issues erodes the predominance of common issues and affects
the manageability of the class mechanism as the superior method for
resolution.51 For example, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, a
products liability case against asbestos companies brought by plaintiffs
with a broad array of claims and individual issues,52 the Supreme Court
held that the proposed common factor, “the health consequences of
asbestos,” could not meet the predominance requirement.53 Similarly,
many courts have refused to certify Rule 23(b)(3) classes when their
size became too unwieldy or unmanageable to conduct as a single
action.54

50

See Hines, Dangerous Allure, supra note 7, at 570:
The mass tort dilemma in part results from that specter alone, the sheer number of
potential mass tort claimants who might file lawsuits. Often courts are importuned to
certify a class action, for example, in order to forestall an otherwise inevitable and
unmanageable inundation of cases asserting injury as a result of an alleged mass tort.
51 See id. at 577-81. Securities fraud and antitrust cases are notable exceptions. Because of
the uniformity of harm and legal issues, these cases generally fit easier into the class model than
other Rule 23(b)(3) cases, despite their large class membership. See id. at 570 n.22; Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (“Predominance is a test readily met in certain
cases . . . alleging . . . securities fraud.”).
52 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624:
Class members were exposed to different asbestos-containing products, for different
amounts of time, in different ways, and over different periods. Some class members
suffer no physical injury or have only asymptomatic pleural changes, while others
suffer from lung cancer, disabling asbestosis, or from mesothelioma . . . . Each has a
different history of cigarette smoking, a factor that complicates the causation inquiry.
53 Id.
54 See Hines, Dangerous Allure, supra note 7, at 580-81.
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III. ENTER SUBCLASSES
A.

The Theories of Subclassing at Certification

With so much riding on class certification, and with the increased
size of classes limiting plaintiffs’ certification prospects, plaintiffs (and
courts) have turned to Rule 23(c) as a way to save otherwise
uncertifiable class actions.55 Subsection (c)(4)(B) states: “When
appropriate . . . a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass
treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed
and applied accordingly.”56 Plaintiffs confronted with a broad class that
may not survive the certification decision may present subclasses as a
viable option for maintaining the scope of the global class in smaller,
multiple chunks, even though the global class cannot be certified.57
This result could be justified by what I call the “replacement
theory” of subclasses. Under this theory, if a global class cannot meet
the certification requirements, the class can be subclassed and each
subclass treated as one of multiple classes that each are then
independently tested under Rule 23. The global class never goes
through the certification ringer (perhaps because certification would not
be possible with or without subclasses), but is, instead, simply replaced
by multiple subclasses.
A contrary theory, what I call the “contingency theory,” counters
that there can be no “subclass” without a global class. In other words,
the availability of subclasses is contingent on the certifiability of the
global class. For example, if no common issue united a putative class,
that class would fail Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement and be
uncertifiable, even if proposed subclasses group common issues
together. Although each subclass might independently satisfy Rule 23’s
requirements, the global class still would fail the commonality test, and
therefore neither the global class nor the subclasses would be entitled to
certification.
One role of subclassing consistent with both theories is that
subclassing could help the global class meet the certification
requirements. In other words, a global class that by itself would fail the
adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) because of
divergent interests among class members may be able to meet that
requirement through subclassing. By isolating divergent interests in
separate subclasses with separate representatives, the subclasses resolve
55
56
57

See, e.g., Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 190 (4th Cir. 1993).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(B).
See, e.g., text accompanying notes 110-118.
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the global class’s adequacy problems, and then both can be certified
under Rule 23.
I assume in this Article that this latter role of subclassing is
proper.58 It does not, however, affect the critical distinction between the
replacement theory and contingency theory: whether a global class that
cannot meet Rule 23’s requirements even with subclasses can be
replaced by certified subclasses. That question remains unresolved, as I
demonstrate next.
B.

Supreme Court

In three cases, the Supreme Court has had—but has not taken—the
opportunity to address the conflict between the two theories of
subclassing. I will describe each separately.
1.

Geraghty

In the first, United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty,59 a
prisoner brought a class action challenging parole procedures on behalf
of himself and other prisoners eligible for parole.60 The district court
denied certification on the ground that individual issues existed and
because typicality was lacking.61 The court also simultaneously granted
summary judgment for the defendant.62 Geraghty appealed both issues,

58 The leading treatises agree that subclasses may be used for this purpose. See 7A WRIGHT,
supra note 5, § 1790, at 585 (“Subdivision (c)(4) is particularly helpful in enabling courts to
restructure complex cases to meet the other requirements for maintaining a class action.”); id. §
1790, at 268-69 (stating, as an example, that subclassing could help certify a class under the
manageability requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)); 7A id. § 1764, at 312-13 (“Finally, in considering a
question under Rule 23(a)(3), the court should keep in mind that it has the authority under Rule
23(c)(1) and Rule 23(c)(4) to shape the contours of the action by allowing class treatment for only
some of the issues or by dividing the original class into subclasses.”); id. § 1779, at 151
(suggesting that Rule 23(c)(4) can be utilized to maintain the superiority of the class mechanism
for an otherwise unmanageable class); id. § 1780, at 175 (suggesting that the manageability
determination of Rule 23(b)(3) could be influenced by subclasses); id. § 1765, at 313-25
(suggesting that a court can cure adequacy problems with subclasses at the certification stage); 5
MOORE, supra note 5, § 23.24[7], at 23-99 (stating that if typicality is not met, “the court has
broad authority to . . . divide the class into subclasses . . . so that the representative parties satisfy
the typicality requirement”); id. § 23.25[6], at 23-147-48 (“If events occurring after class
certification render a class representative inadequate, a court may remedy the problem
by . . . certifying subclasses . . . .”).
59 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
60 Id. at 393.
61 Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F. Supp. 737, 740-41 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
62 Id.
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but before he could file a brief in the Third Circuit, he was released
from prison and, therefore, no longer eligible for parole himself.63
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that Geraghty’s release did not
moot the litigation or the appeal, vacated the grant of summary
judgment, and held that the district court erred in failing to consider
whether subclasses could have alleviated the district court’s concerns.64
The Third Circuit agreed with the district court that some issues were
uncommon but concluded that “the district court need not have refused
class certification in toto because certain claims were inapplicable to the
entire class.”65 The Third Circuit chastised the district court for failing
to consider “the powers and duties of the trial court under section
(c)(4).”66 Under that section, “the trial judge has the power to certify
certain issues as subject to class adjudication, and to limit overbroad
classes by the use of sub-classes.”67 In short, the Third Circuit held that
the district court could have used subclasses to alleviate intra-class
incompatibilities.68 Accordingly, the Third Circuit remanded for
consideration of subclasses.69
The Supreme Court substantially affirmed the Third Circuit. The
Court first affirmed the Court of Appeals’ holding that the case was not
moot.70 Turning to the subclass question, the Court held that the district
court had no obligation to consider subclasses sua sponte.71 However,
the Court affirmed the remand order for consideration of subclasses as
“a proper disposition.”72 The remand to consider subclassing was
appropriate, the Court reasoned, because the district court had denied
certification and dismissed the case on the merits at the same time; there
was therefore no reason for any party or the court to consider
subclasses.73 The remand would allow the plaintiff, now that the
adverse merits decision had been vacated, to seek subclasses.74
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 394.
Id. at 395.
Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 579 F.2d 238, 252-53 (3d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 253.
Id.
Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 254.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 395-407.
Id. at 408 (“The court has no sua sponte obligation so to act.”).
Id.
Id.:
Respondent had no real opportunity to request certification of subclasses after the class
he proposed was rejected. The District Court denied class certification at the same
time it rendered its adverse decision on the merits. Requesting subclass certification at
that time would have been a futile act. The District Court was not about to invest effort
in deciding the subclass question after it had ruled that no relief on the merits was
available.
74 Id. (“The remand merely gives respondent the opportunity to perform his function [of
seeking subclasses] in the adversary system.”).
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Neither the contingency theory nor the replacement theory is
inconsistent with Geraghty. None of the courts determined that the
global class was uncertifiable even with subclasses. Indeed, on remand,
the district court certified a single class without subclasses.75 In
addition, the Supreme Court was far more concerned with the mootness
issue and whether the district court had an independent obligation to
consider subclasses sua sponte. It is likely that the propriety of
subclasses in the first instance received relatively short shrift by the
Justices. Thus, Geraghty says nothing about the propriety of certifying
a global class that fails to meet Rule 23 even with the help of
subclasses.
2.

Amchem

In the second case, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,76 the Court
considered the legitimacy under Rule 23 of a class action certified for
the purpose of achieving a global settlement of asbestos-related
claims.77 The putative class included both asbestos victims (or their
families) who had filed asbestos-related lawsuits and those who had not;
the class also asserted a variety of state-law claims for relief.78
Objectors challenged the settlement based on adequacy grounds under
Rule 23(a)(4), but the district court certified the 23(b)(3) class
essentially by finding that the proposed settlement was fair and
adequate under Rule 23(e).79 The district court deemed subclasses
unnecessary because they would entail additional cost and delay.80
The Supreme Court reversed because the class failed to meet the
requirements of Rule 23.81 The Court began, however, by noting:
“Settlement is relevant to a class certification.”82 One way in which
settlement matters, explained the Court, is that class requirements
relevant to trial manageability are not mandated.83 However, the Court
continued, class requirements designed to ensure adequacy of
representation “demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the
settlement context.”84 The Court reasoned that Rule 23(e), which at that
75 Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 552 F. Supp. 276, 278 (M.D. Pa. 1982), aff’d, 719 F.2d
1199 (3d Cir. 1983).
76 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
77 Id. at 597.
78 Id. at 602-03.
79 Id. at 597, 605-08.
80 Id. at 608.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 619.
83 Id. at 620.
84 Id.
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time permitted the settlement of a class if notice is given to all class
members,85 “was designed to function as an additional requirement, not
a superseding direction, for the ‘class action’ to which Rule 23(e) refers
is one qualified for certification under Rule 23(a) and (b).”86 The Court
reasoned that if certification of a settlement class hinged solely on the
fairness of the settlement, without regard to the requirements of Rule
23(a) and (b), “both class counsel and court would be disarmed. Class
counsel confined to settlement negotiations could not use the threat of
litigation to press for a better offer, . . . and the court would face a
bargain proffered for its approval without benefit of adversarial
investigation.”87 In addition, Rule 23 contains no authorization for
courts “to substitute for Rule 23’s certification criteria a standard never
adopted—that if a settlement is ‘fair,’ then certification is proper.”88
Applying this strict Rule 23 standard, the Court held that the class failed
to meet both the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement89 and the
Rule 23(a)(4) “adequacy” requirement.90
In the course of its reasoning, the Court discussed subclasses in
several contexts.
In discussing the adequacy of representation
deficiency, the Court several times alluded to the lack of subclasses,91
suggesting that, in the Court’s view, Rule 23(c)(4)(B) could have helped
the class overcome its divergences to satisfy Rule 23(a)(4).92 This
commentary supports the theory that subclasses can be used to help an
otherwise uncertifiable class meet the requirements of Rule 23.
However, it does not confront the critical question dividing the
contingency and replacement theories: whether subclasses could have

85 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (1997) (amended 1988 & 2003) (“A class action shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal
or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.”).
Rule 23(e) has been amended twice since 1997 and no longer contains such a reference to a “class
action,” though it does retain the requirements of court approval and notice prior to settlement of
a certified class. Id. at R. 23(e)(1) (2005).
86 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 622.
89 Id. at 622-23.
90 Id. at 625.
91 Id. at 626 (stating that “named parties with diverse medical conditions sought to act on
behalf of a single giant class rather than on behalf of discrete subclasses”); id. at 627 (“Although
the named parties alleged a range of complaints, each served generally as representative for the
whole, not for a separate constituency.”); id. (“‘[W]here differences among members of a class
are such that subclasses must be established, we know of no authority that permits a court to
approve a settlement without creating subclasses on the basis of consents by members of a unitary
class, some of whom happen to be members of the distinct subgroups.’”) (quoting In re Joint E. &
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1992)).
92 Id. at 626-27. The dissent appeared to agree. Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“These
differences might warrant subclasses, though subclasses can have problems of their own.”).
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permitted certification even if the global class still could not satisfy
Rule 23’s requirements. Thus, Amchem does not resolve the issue.
3.

Ortiz

In the third case, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,93 the Court considered
the conditions for certifying a mandatory settlement class on a limited
fund theory under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).94 The Court held that plaintiffs
must show that the fund is limited by factors other than settlement and
that the allocation of settlement funds has addressed any internal class
conflicts.95
The class comprised persons adversely affected by asbestos in one
of three ways: all persons with personal injury claims against
Fibreboard for asbestos exposure who had not yet brought suit or settled
their claims, those who had dismissed such claims but retained the right
to bring future actions against Fibreboard, and past, present, and future
relatives of exposed persons.96 The class excluded claimants with
actions presently pending against Fibreboard or claimants whose only
retained right to sue Fibreboard was upon development of an asbestosrelated malignancy.97 The class argued that certification for settlement
purposes was necessary to ensure that sufficient insurance funds were
available to compensate the class members.98
The district court certified the class under Rules 23(a) and
23(b)(1)(B) and approved the settlement as fair under Rule 23(e), and
the Fifth Circuit affirmed.99 Both courts found commonality satisfied
by the class members’ shared interest in securing and equitably
distributing maximum settlement funds and typicality satisfied by the
class representatives’ same shared interest.100
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that “the Fifth Circuit fell
short in its attention to Amchem’s explanation of the governing legal
standards.”101 The Court reiterated Amchem’s teaching that “a fairness
hearing under Rule 23(e) is no substitute for rigorous adherence to those

93
94

527 U.S. 815 (1999).
Id. at 821 (“This case turns on the conditions for certifying a mandatory settlement class on
a limited fund theory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B).”).
95 Id. (“We hold that applicants for contested certification on this rationale must show that the
fund is limited by more than the agreement of the parties, and has been allocated to claimants
belonging within the class by a process addressing any conflicting interests of class members.”).
96 Id. at 825-26.
97 Id. at 826.
98 Id. at 827.
99 Id. at 827-30.
100 Id. at 829.
101 Id. at 831.
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provisions of the Rule ‘designed to protect absentees.’”102 The Court
concluded that a fund cannot become limited and certifiable under Rule
23(b)(1)(B) merely because of the limitations imposed by the agreement
of the parties; rather, the parties must present independent evidence of
the limits and insufficencies of the fund, evidence which other parties
are entitled to challenge.103
By analogizing to Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirement,104 the
Court reasoned that providing objecting class members and other parties
meaningful opportunity to challenge the settlement and its allocation
requires fair representation of the opposition groups.105 The Court
noted that the class failed to include several types of claimants, and that,
to be maintained as a limited fund under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the district
court should have provided the structural protections of Rule 23(c)(4)
subclasses to maintain equity to all types of claimants.106
In addition, even those within the class itself were not adequately
represented by the global class. The Court stated that
it is obvious after Amchem that a class divided between holders of
present and future claims (some of the latter involving no physical
injury and to claimants not yet born) requires division into
homogeneous subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B), with separate
representation to eliminate conflicting interests of counsel . . . . No
such procedure was employed here, and the conflict was as contrary
to the equitable obligation entailed by the limited fund rationale as it
was to the requirements of structural protection applicable to all class
actions under Rule 23(a)(4).107

In other words, the district court erroneously focused on the
settlement in determining that commonality and typicality were satisfied
and failed to resolve “potentially conflicting interests of easily
identifiable categories of claimants . . . by provisional certification of
subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4), relying instead on its post hoc findings
at the fairness hearing that these subclasses in fact had been adequately
represented.”108
The Court concluded:
102
103
104

Id. at 849 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)).
Id. at 849-53.
Id. at 856 n.31 (“This adequacy of representation concern parallels the enquiry required at
the threshold under Rule 23(a)(4), but as we indicated in Amchem, the same concerns that drive
the threshold findings under Rule 23(a) may also influence the propriety of the certification
decision under the subdivisions of Rule 23(b).”) (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623 n.18).
105 Id. at 854 (“There are two issues, the inclusiveness of the class and the fairness of
distributions to those within it.”).
106 Id. at 855 (“Finally, as discussed below, even ostensible parity between settling nonclass
plaintiffs and class members would be insufficient to overcome the failure to provide the
structural protection of independent representation as for subclasses with conflicting interests.”).
107 Id. at 856-57.
108 Id. at 831-32.
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Assuming arguendo that a mandatory, limited fund rationale could
under some circumstances be applied to a settlement class of tort
claimants, it would be essential that the fund be shown to be limited
independently of the agreement of the parties to the action, and
equally essential under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) that the class
include all those with claims unsatisfied at the time of the settlement
negotiations, with intraclass conflicts addressed by recognizing
independently represented subclasses. . . . Those separate
settlements, together with other exclusions from the claimant class,
precluded adequate structural protection by subclass treatment,
which was not even afforded to the conflicting elements within the
class as certified.109

Ortiz thus contains several allusions to subclasses and their role. It
states that subclasses may be necessary to maintain structural
protections of equity in limited fund cases. In other words, subclasses
may be necessary to the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund determination
and the Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy determination. However, like Amchem
and Geraghty, Ortiz does not directly address the conflict between the
replacement theory and the contingency theory of subclasses. Ortiz
stands only for the principle that subclasses may be necessary to certify
a global class. Ortiz did not address the question of whether subclasses
may be independently certified if the global class is not.
C.

Lower Court Conflicts

Neither theory has been uniformly adopted in the lower courts.
Some courts have assumed, without directly deciding, that the
replacement theory is the correct interpretation of Rule 23. For
example, in In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc.,110 a district court
confronted a nationwide products liability action against a pacemaker
company.111 Although the district court recognized that states’ products
liability laws differ,112 it nevertheless accepted the plaintiffs’ subclass
proposal to divide the class among states with similar legal standards.
The plaintiffs proposed two negligence subclasses, four strict liability
subclasses, and three punitive damages subclasses.113 The court
proceeded to evaluate—and certify—each individual subclass
separately114 and even sua sponte created two additional subclasses.115
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id. at 864-65.
172 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
Id. at 276, 278.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 278-79.
Id. at 279-95.
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However, the court did not systematically evaluate the global class for
compliance with Rule 23, most likely because the legal variations made
the global class uncertifiable under Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance
requirement. Implicitly, Telectronics followed the replacement theory
of subclasses by certifying subclasses without addressing the
certifiability of the global class.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in Klay v. Humana, Inc.,116
reasoned that although individualized issues would likely predominate
in a nationwide class alleging state law causes of action, “if the
applicable state laws can be sorted into a small number of groups, each
containing materially identical legal standards, then certification of
subclasses embracing each of the dominant legal standards can be
appropriate.”117
Klay thus assumed that commonality and
predominance, factors that the global class in all likelihood could not
meet, could be circumvented through the use of subclasses.118
At least one court, however, has unequivocally rejected (though
without explanation) the replacement theory. In Sprague v. General
Motors Corp.,119 the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, confronted a putative
class of 50,000 employees claiming violations of ERISA.120 The district
court certified the class and created four subclasses.121 The Sixth
Circuit reversed. The court first found that the putative class failed the
commonality and typicality requirements.122 In reference to the
subclasses, the court stated perfunctorily: “The district court’s use of
subclasses did not solve the problem. Subclasses are not a substitute
for compliance with Rule 23.”123 Although the majority made this
statement only in a footnote, the issue was not merely an aside: at least
two of the dissenters believed that the use of subclasses could have
saved certification.124 Nevertheless, the majority gave no inkling as to
the reasoning underlying its statement.
The only agency determination I have found that addresses the
subclass question is an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) opinion, DuBuclet v. Department of Health & Human
115
116
117
118

Id. at 287.
382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1261-62.
For arguments in support of Klay’s flexible approach to Rule 23(c)(4), see Cabraser, supra
note 7, at 1479-84.
119 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
120 Id. at 392-93.
121 Id. at 396-97.
122 Id. at 397-99.
123 Id. at 399 n.9 (emphasis added).
124 Id. at 407 (Lively, J., dissenting) (“I believe, further, the ‘typicality’ requirement was met
by the district court’s creation of four subclasses.”); id. at 414-15 (Martin, C.J., dissenting)
(suggesting that subclasses could account for the differences in class commonality and typicality).
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Services.125 The EEOC regulations have the same certification
requirements as Rule 23(a).126 They also permit subclasses in language
nearly identical to Rule 23(c)(4)(B).127 In DuBuclet, an EEOC
Administrative Examiner found that the class complaint failed the
commonality, typicality, and adequacy tests.128 The Examiner then
stated:
Finally, the examiner is not unaware of the regulations which permit
him to create sub-classes as appropriate. The purposes of such a
provision, however, is to allow a class which has previously met
class action prerequisites to continue after an unforeseen conflict of
interest arises and in which subclasses are proper corrective
measures. It is not to restructure an initially invalid class.129

Although this statement sets forth the Examiner’s belief that subclasses
can only be used after a global class has been certified, the Examiner
did not give any support or other reasoning for his conclusion.
Thus, although the courts are split as to the role of subclasses in
certification decisions, no court has comprehensively analyzed the issue
or given a reasoned resolution of it. Instead, the courts have tended to
make assumptions one way or another without providing guidance.
IV. INTERPRETATION
In the previous Parts, I introduced the two competing theories of
subclassing—the replacement theory and the contingency theory—and
demonstrated that no court or commentator has developed a fully
reasoned view of the correct interpretation. In this Part, I analyze Rule
23(c)(4)(B)’s text, context, structure, history, and underlying norms to
determine which theory is better supported. I conclude that the
replacement theory is the better interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)(B) as
written and under current court decisions. There are counterarguments
in favor of the contingency theory, but, as I explain below, I do not
believe they outweigh those that support the replacement theory.
A.

125
126
127

Text

No. 01820720, 1982 WL 531956 (EEOC Sept. 17, 1982).
See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.204(d)(2) (2005).
See id. § 1614.204(d)(6) (“When appropriate, the administrative judge may decide that a
class be divided into subclasses and that each subclass be treated as a class, and the provisions of
this section then shall be construed and applied accordingly.”).
128 DuBuclet, 1982 WL 531956, at *5-12.
129 Id. at *12 (emphasis added).
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As the Supreme Court has instructed, the interpretation of Rule 23
begins with its text.130 Rule 23(c)(4)(B) states: “When appropriate . . . a
class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a
class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied
accordingly.”131
Taking the last part first, the phrase “construed and applied
accordingly” seems straightforward.132 When a court divides a class
into subclasses, each subclass, to be maintained, separately must satisfy
the requirements of Rule 23. Most courts have construed this provision
so.133
The more difficult question, for present purposes, is when a court
can divide a class into subclasses. The Rules do not give any explicit
guidance as to when it might be appropriate to do so. Indeed, Rule
23(c)(4) is tautologically unhelpful; its direct response is, well, “[w]hen
appropriate.”134 The most guidance that can be gleaned from this phrase
is that courts have some discretion to use Rule 23(c)(4) to further the
goals and protections of Rule 23.
One textual clue is that it must be a “class” that is divided into
subclasses. One could interpret the term “class” to mean a class that is
itself certifiable under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b). This interpretation
would support the contingency theory because it posits that a certifiable
130 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (stating that interpretation
starts with “the Rule as now composed”).
131 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(B).
132 The phrase certainly applies to subclasses. See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to
the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 51, 56 (1996) (noting that the Advisory
Committee even considered an amendment to limit the phrase to Rule 23(c)(4)(B)).
133 See, e.g., Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 189 (4th Cir. 1994);
Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 599 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Subclasses
must satisfy the class action requirements . . . .”); Betts v. Reliable Collection Agency, 659 F.2d
1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[E]ach subclass must independently meet the requirements of Rule
23 . . . .”); Johnson v. Am. Credit Co., 581 F.2d 526, 532 (5th Cir. 1978); 1 NEWBERG, supra note
5, § 3:9, at 267-68 (stating that “it is generally settled that each subclass must independently
satisfy class action criteria”); 3 id. § 9:48, at 422-23 (“Subclasses, however, must meet the same
class action requirements as any other defined class before certification of the subclass is
proper.”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 7, § 33.33, at 340 (“Each class or
subclass must independently satisfy all the prerequisites of Rules 23(a) and (b).”); 5 MOORE,
supra note 5, § 23.86[1][c], at 23-352 (“Each subclass must independently satisfy the class action
requirements of Rule 23 before it may be certified.”); 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 1790, at
284 (stating that “each subclass must independently meet the requirements of Rule 23 for
maintenance of a class action”). Interestingly, however, there is some dispute as to whether each
individual subclass must satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a). Compare 1
NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 3:9, at 268 (asserting that “if the subclass members are also members
of the larger, already certified class, they may not be required to satisfy independently the
numerosity requirement”), with 5 id. § 17:9, at 320-21 (describing a split in court authority on this
issue), and 5 MOORE, supra note 5, § 23.86[1][c], at 23-353 n.14 (same), and MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 7 § 32.53, at 340 (“The creation of a number of subclasses
may result in some that are too small to satisfy the numerosity requirement . . . .”).
134 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
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class is logically antecedent (or at least simultaneous) to any attempt to
subclass.
But the rest of Rule 23 does not support that interpretation. The
term “class” is used throughout Rule 23 detached from connotations of
certifiability. Rule 23(a), for example, assumes that the term “class”
describes something that exists prior to, and may even exist without,
certification: “One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if [the prerequisites are
met].”135 Under this formulation, some “classes” will not meet the
prerequisites and will be uncertifiable.136
This does not mean that a mere “class,” referenced as such in the
Rules, cannot also be a certifiable or certified class action (as it must in
certain provisions of Rule 23(c)137); it just means that the term “class”
does not necessarily refer to a certifiable class. This interpretation of
the term “class” in Rule 23(c)(4) thus supports the replacement theory
because an uncertified class may be divided into subclasses.
Another textual clue is the term “subclass.” The Rules do not
define the term. Nor does Black’s Law Dictionary. But the ordinary
meaning is not difficult to divine. A “subclass” most naturally means a
subdivision or subset of a class. This is confirmed by the Rule, which
states that “a class may be divided into subclasses.”138 One might fairly
reason that for a subclass to remain a subclass after it is created, the
class must continue to exist; otherwise, the subclass would simply
become a new class. There can be, in other words, no subclass without
a class.
There are two problems with this line of reasoning. The first,
discussed above, is that the term “class,” as used in Rule 23(c)(4)(B), is
not restricted to certifiable classes. Thus, just because the global class
cannot be certified does not mean that it ceases to be a class. The global
class remains, albeit uncertified, and subclasses (certified or not) may

135
136

Id. at R. 23(a).
One could argue that the term “class action,” rather than the term “class,” is restricted to
certifiable classes. See, e.g., id. (entitled “Class Actions”) (emphasis added); id. at R. 23(a)
(entitled “Prerequisites to a Class Action”); id. at R. 23(b) (stating that an action “may be
maintained as a class action” if the prerequisites are met; id. at R. 23(c) (entitled “Determining by
Order Whether to Certify a Class Action”); id. at R. 23(h) (applying to “an action certified as a
class action”); id. at R. 23(c)(1), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendments (stating that if a
class action certification is later determined to be unsound, “the action should be stripped of its
character as a class action . . . . [and] becomes a nonclass action . . .”). But see Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005, 109 Pub. L. 2, 119 Stat. 4 (defining “class action” as “any civil action filed”
under Rule 23 or an analogous state court rule, without mentioning certification).
137 Id. at R. 23(c)(1)(B) (“An order certifying a class action must define the class and the class
claims, issues, or defenses . . . .”); id. at R. 23(c)(2)(A) (“For any class certified under Rule
23(b)(1) or (2), the court may direct appropriate notice to the class.”).
138 Id. at R. 23(c)(4)(B).
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then comfortably exist within the ordinary meaning of the term
“subclass.”
The second problem is that Rule 23(c)(4)(B) specifically
contemplates the transformation of subclasses into ordinary classes by
providing that each subclass is then “treated as a class.”139 This key
provision strongly supports the replacement theory because it naturally
reads to permit a court to create subclasses and then essentially
eliminate the “sub” by treating them as multiple classes and
disregarding the global class.
Rule 23(c) further supports the
replacement theory because its title groups the topic “Multiple Classes”
with “Subclasses.”140 Oddly enough, the text of the Rule does not
mention “multiple classes.” But the Advisory Committee Notes
explain, “Two or more classes may be represented in a single action.
Where a class is found to include subclasses divergent in interest, the
class may be divided correspondingly, and each subclass treated as a
class.”141 This explanation supports the ability of a court to take a
global class, divide it into subclasses, and then treat the subclasses as
multiple “classes” by disregarding the global class originally presented.
Thus, the text of Rule 23(c)(4)(B) supports the replacement theory, not
the contingency theory.
Contingency theorists might argue that the phrase “each subclass
treated as a class” is only important for purposes of the following
phrase: “and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and
applied accordingly.”142 In other words, the true import of Rule
23(c)(4)(B) is that subclasses must independently satisfy Rule 23(a) and
(b), and the only way to link subclasses to the certification requirements
is to call them “classes” for the purposes of certification.
Though plausible, this interpretation is unlikely. The text does not
by its terms limit the term “class” only for the purposes of imposing the
certification requirements. In addition, far less convoluted phrasing
would have accomplished that goal. For example, the drafters could
have written: “When appropriate . . . a class may be divided into
subclasses . . . and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and
applied [to those subclasses].”143 In short, the phrase “each subclass
treated as a class” supports the transformation of subclasses into
multiple classes. For these reasons, the text of Rule 23(c)(4)(B)
strongly supports the replacement theory.

139
140
141
142
143

Id.
Id. at R. 23(c).
Id. at R. 23(c)(4), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
Id.
Id. at R. 23(c)(4)(B).
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Context

The subclassing provision is intertwined with the issue class
provision. Rule 23(c)(4) reads, in full: “When appropriate (A) an action
may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to
individual issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each
subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be
construed and applied accordingly.”144 Because the two provisions are
intertwined, the interpretation of the scope of issue classes under Rule
23(c)(4)(A) could help interpret the scope of subclasses under Rule
23(c)(4)(B).
Although commentators do not agree on the proper interpretation
of Rule 23(c)(4)(A),145 a growing majority of courts supports an
interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) that permits certification of particular
issues even if the global action cannot itself satisfy the certification
requirements. The adoption of such a view supports a similar
interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)(B).
For example, in Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc.,146
purchasers and beneficiaries of a multi-employer health care plan
brought class action claims growing out of the plan’s collapse. The
Fourth Circuit held that a class action could be maintained as to a
particular issue (a particular claim brought by the class) under Rule
23(c)(4)(A) despite finding that the global class failed to satisfy the
Rule 23(b)(3) requirement for all claims.147
The dissent took the position that “even in cases involving the
certification of issue-only classes, the common issues must predominate
over questions affecting only individual members of the class in the
context of the action as a whole,”148 and that Rule 23(b) serves as the
“gates” through which every action must first pass before Rule 23(c) is
to be considered.149 The majority, of course, disagreed. It viewed the
dissent’s sequentialist argument as backwards: Rule 23(c)(4)(A) permits
the bringing or maintenance of an issue class before application of
Rules 23(a) and (b).150 It also reasoned that if Rule 23(c)(4) could only
be considered after certification, then the “manageability” provisions of
144
145
146
147
148
149

Id. at R. 23(c)(4).
See supra note 7.
348 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 428-34.
Id. at 448 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 449 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). I note that the dissent took the view that not even the
contingency theory does—that Rule 23(c)(4) cannot even help a global class itself meet the
certification requirements.
150 Id. at 439.
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Rule 23(c)(4) could have no impact on the manageability requirement
of Rule 23(b)(3), a result at odds with the purpose of Rule 23(c)(4) in
the first place.151 Finally, it relied on prior Fourth Circuit precedent.152
In Chiang v. Veneman,153 the Third Circuit adopted a similar
interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)(A). The Department of Agriculture
appealed from the certification of a class of minorities and women from
the Virgin Islands discriminated against in the administration of loan
programs.154 The court noted that two issues were ripe for class
adjudication even though individual issues could predominate in other
areas.155 Accordingly, it isolated issue classes under Rule 23(c)(4)(A)
and proceeded to determine that Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance
requirement was met with respect to those issues.156
The Second and Ninth Circuits have hinted at their support for this
interpretation. In Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.,157 a district court
certified, without elaboration, a nationwide class and subclass in a
products liability case against the manufacturer of a drug used to treat
epilepsy.158 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated:
Implicit in the satisfaction of the predominance test is the notion that
the adjudication of common issues will help achieve judicial
economy. . . . Even if the common questions do not predominate
over the individual questions so that class certification is warranted,
Rule 23 authorizes the district court in appropriate cases to isolate
the common issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class
treatment of these particular issues.159

And in Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co.,160 the Second
Circuit, while not directly addressing the issue itself, directed lower
courts to pay heed to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Valentino.161
151 Id. (“Thus, under the dissent’s reading of Rule 23, a court could only use subsection (c)(4)
to manage cases that the court had already determined would be manageable without
consideration of subsection (c)(4). This reading leaves subsection (c)(4)(A) without any practical
application, thereby rendering it superfluous.”).
152 See, e.g., Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 185 (4th Cir. 1992)
(quoting In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 728 (4th Cir. 1989)):
This court also has admonished district courts to “take full advantage of the provision
in [Rule 23(c)(4)] permitting class treatment of separate issues” in order “to promote
the use of the class device and to reduce the range of disputed issues” in complex
litigation. . . . [I]f an action “includes multiple claims, one or more of which might
qualify as a certifiable class claim, the court may separate such claims from other
claims in the action and certify them under the provisions of subdivision (c)(4).”
153 385 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2004).
154 Id. at 259.
155 Id. at 267.
156 Id. at 273.
157 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996).
158 Id. at 1228.
159 Id. at 1234.
160 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001).
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The lone contrarian is the Fifth Circuit. In Castano v. American
Tobacco Co.,162 the Fifth Circuit stated, in the context of an issue class
action under Rule 23(c)(4)(A):
A district court cannot manufacture predominance through the
nimble use of subdivision (c)(4). The proper interpretation of the
interaction between subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that a cause of
action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of
(b)(3) and that (c)(4) is a housekeeping rule that allows courts to
sever the common issues for a class trial. . . . Reading rule 23(c)(4)
as allowing a court to sever issues until the remaining common issue
predominates over the remaining individual issues would eviscerate
the predominance requirement of rule 23(b)(3); the result would be
automatic certification in every case where there is a common issue,
a result that could not have been intended.163

The Fifth Circuit has twice reaffirmed Castano,164 though there is
some indication that it is striking a more nuanced position. In Bolin v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.,165 the Fifth Circuit supported certification on a
claim-by-claim basis, rather than a holistic basis, and noted that “Rule
23(c)(4) explicitly recognizes the flexibility that courts need in class
certification by allowing certification ‘with respect to particular issues’
the division of the class into subclasses.”166
Despite Castano, a solid majority of circuit courts167 agrees that
Rule 23(c)(4)(A) can be used to certify a class with respect to particular
issues even if the global action is not itself certifiable. Reading Rule
23(c)(4)(A) and Rule 23(c)(4)(B) in pari materia,168 that interpretation
of issue classes suggests that a similar interpretation should apply to

161
162
163
164

Id. at 167 n.12.
84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 745 n.21 (citation omitted).
See Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 263 F.3d 394, 409 (5th Cir. 2001), withdrawn, 281 F.3d 477
(5th Cir. 2002); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 422 (5th Cir. 1998).
165 231 F.3d 970 (5th Cir. 2000).
166 Id. at 976.
167 District courts have also split. Compare Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 205 F.R.D.
43 (D.D.C. 2002) (certifying common issues in a hybrid class action), and Emig v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 184 F.R.D. 379, 395 (D. Kan. 1998) (explaining that Rule 23(c)(4)(A) permits “adjudication
of any issues common to the class even though the entire litigation may not satisfy the
requirements of Rule 23”), with Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 648 (M.D. Fla. 2001)
(refusing to certify an issue class), and Cohn v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 189 F.R.D. 209 (D.
Conn. 1999) (same).
168 The cannon of statutory construction in pari materia (literally, in the same matter) instructs
a court to construe provisions pertaining to the same subject matter as if they were one law. See
Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed.
2004). The Supreme Court has read certain closely-tied provisions of statutes in pari materia to
aid one provision’s interpretation. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 71112 (1996) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) should be read in pari materia with § 1447(d)).
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subclassing.
Accordingly, the current circuit caselaw on Rule
23(c)(4)(A) supports the replacement theory for Rule 23(c)(4)(B).
C.

Structure

In contrast to the support for the replacement theory provided by
the text and context of Rule 23(c)(4)(B), the location of the subclass
provision in Rule 23(c), in the midst of other procedural and
housekeeping provisions, lends support for the contingency theory. In
this section, I give credit to that argument but explain why, on balance,
this structural argument is not as persuasive as the textual argument.
As a general matter, Rules 23(a) and (b) are the substantive
requirements for class certification. Rule 23(a) lists the “prerequisites”
to a class action.169 If those “prerequisites” are “satisfied,” then the
“action may be maintained as a class action” if one of the Rule 23(b)
requirements is also satisfied.170 Rules 23(a) and (b) contain the nuts
and bolts of certification.
Rule 23(c), in contrast, is not a “prerequisite” to anything. It deals
with a hodgepodge of housekeeping matters, as its title illustrates:
“Determining by Order Whether to Certify a Class Action; Appointing
Class Counsel; Notice and Membership in Class; Judgment; Multiple
Classes and Subclasses.”171 Subsection (c)(1), for example, requires a
court to order certification, if warranted, “at an early practicable
time,”172 to define the class, and to appoint class counsel.173 Rule
23(c)(1) also permits a certification order to be “altered or amended
before final judgment.”174 Rule 23(c)(2) pertains to notice to class
members.175 Rule 23(c)(3) directs a judgment to specify the class

169
170
171
172
173
174
175

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
Id. at R. 23(b).
Id. at R. 23(c).
Id. at R. 23(c)(1)(A).
Id. at R. 23(c)(1)(B).
Id. at R. 23(c)(1)(C).
Id. at R. 23(c)(2).
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members to which it pertains.176 In the midst of these are the
subclassing and issue class provisions of Rule 23(c)(4).177
The subclassing provision is placed in the management provisions
of Rule 23(c), rather than in the certification requirement provisions of
Rule 23(a) or Rule 23(b). As recited above, Rule 23(c) deals with
housekeeping issues and due process protections, not class certification
requirements. It most naturally comes into play only after the
“prerequisites” of Rule 23(a) have been met and perhaps even after a
class action is deemed “maintainable” under Rule 23(b). Thus, the
location of the subclassing authorization, in Rule 23(c) rather than in
Rule 23(a) or Rule 23(b), supports the contingency theory—that Rule
23(c) applies only after (or at least at the same time that) a class has met
the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b).178 The replacement
theory, in other words, puts the cart before the horse.
This is a plausible argument, and at the very least it should serve as
a call to the Rules Committee and the Court for clarification of the
proper scope of Rule 23(c)(4). Ultimately, however, it less persuasive
than the textual argument for three reasons.
First, the replacement theory is not necessarily any more a
“certification” issue than it is a “management” issue. Indeed, one could
argue that the replacement theory is more of a management issue than a
certification issue because it merely focuses, tracking the text of Rule
23(c)(4)(B), on dividing a global class (certifiable or not) into
subclasses. Certification comes into play only tangentially—as the
basis for maintaining them once they are defined.
Second, Rule 23(c) itself speaks to certification issues and so
cannot be restricted to non-certification “management” issues. Rule
23(c)(4) states that for subclasses (and likely issue classes as well), “the
provisions of this rule [i.e., Rules 23(a) and (b)] shall then be construed

176

Id. at R. 23(c)(2)(B). The rule states that:
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(1) or
(b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the
court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a
class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall
include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2)
was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be
members of the class.

Id.

177
178

Id. at R. 23(c)(4).
At least one commentator and one court have adopted this same reasoning for the
conclusion that Rule 23(c)(4)(A) is not a certification substitute for failure to meet Rule
23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. See, e.g., Hines, End-Run, supra note 7, at 712; Castano v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996). However, as I mentioned, the
commentary is not in consensus on this issue, see supra note 7, and a majority of courts have
rejected it, see supra text accompanying notes 146-167.
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and applied accordingly.”179 As I mentioned above, this provision has
been interpreted to mean that each subclass (or issue class) must then
satisfy Rules 23(a) and (b) before being certified.180 If so, then it
addresses certification at least as much as the replacement theory does.
Indeed, by forcing a court to address Rule 23(a) and (b) certification
issues after creating subclasses under Rule 23(c), Rule 23(c) itself puts
the cart before the horse. In addition, Rule 23(c)(1) also speaks to
certification issues, rather than “management” issues, because it
addresses when certification should be determined.181
Third, the step-wise theory that Rules 23(a) and (b) are “gateways”
through which the case must pass before reaching Rule 23(c) manifests
a rigidity that is contrary to the flexibility inherent in Rule 23.
Certification is designed to be a give-and-take process: Rule 23(c)(1)(C)
allows a court to revisit certification issues at any time before final
judgment.182 And the manageability provisions of Rule 23(c) must be
designed to work in tandem with the requirement of superiority of Rule
23(b)(3); it would be odd for a court confronted with a Rule 23(b)(3)
class to determine whether or not the class is manageable without
looking to the Rule 23(c) provisions specifically addressing
manageability issues.
In short, the argument based on structure—though I give it much
credit—is substantially undermined by the text and spirit of Rule 23,
and therefore it simply does not balance the far clearer textual support
for the replacement theory.
D.

Drafting History

The intentions of the drafters are an important consideration in
understanding the meaning of the subclassing provision,183 particularly
because Rule 23(c)(4)(B) has not substantially changed since enacted in
1966.184 As the Supreme Court has instructed, “we are bound to follow

179
180
181

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
See supra note 132-133 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). Before the 2003 amendments to Rule 23(c), Rule 23(c)(1)
even permitted “conditional” certification, which clearly allowed certification before the
conditions of Rule 23(a) and (b) had been met. Id. at R. 23(c)(1) (1966) (amended 2003).
182 Id. at R.. 23(c)(1)(C).
183 See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1152-69 (2002) (arguing for interpretation based on
drafter intent). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 373 (2000) (criticizing Ortiz
for favoring “rule formalism” over “due process”).
184 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (2005), with id. at R. 23(c)(3) (1966).
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Rule 23 as we understood it upon its adoption.”185 The Advisory
Committee’s Notes are indices of the drafters’ intentions,186 as are the
sentiments of the Committee’s members and its official reporter,
Benjamin Kaplan.187 Unfortunately, neither the Rule’s commentary nor
the drafting history sheds much light on the meaning of subclassing’s
role in certification. At best, they only modestly support the
replacement theory.
1.

The Advisory Committee’s Notes

As noted above, the original commentary on Rule 23(c)(4)(B),
though sparse, tends to support the replacement theory because it tracks
the text by recognizing that “[t]wo or more classes may be represented
in a single action,” and that when subclasses are created, each is “treated
as a class.”188
In fairness, other portions of the Advisory Committee’s Notes
could be read to undermine their support for the replacement theory. In
the commentary on Rule 23(b)(3), the Committee suggested that mass
accidents usually should not be certified because individualized issues
generally predominate over the common issues, and such a class action
would degenerate into multiple lawsuits individually tried.189 The
Committee did not suggest, as the replacement theory does, that a
possible solution would be to subclass until common issues
predominated over individual issues in each subclass. One might have
expected the Committee to spend more time discussing Rule
23(c)(4)(B)’s application to Rule 23(b)(3) classes had the Committee
strongly believed in the replacement theory.190 Thus, the Advisory
185 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 613-25 (1997) (looking to the Advisory Committee’s drafting history); see also Linda
S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is There Smoother Sailing for Class
Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1724-25 (2000) (interpreting Ortiz as favoring an
“originalist stance for Rule 23”).
186 See Struve, supra note 183, at 1156 (stating that the “most logical evidence of such intent
can be found in the Rule’s text and Advisory Committee Notes”); 4 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5,
§ 1029 (stating that the Notes provide “something akin to a ‘legislative history’ of the rules”).
187 See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 833, 834, 842-45 (citing the published views of Benjamin Kaplan);
id. at 882 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority properly relied on Kaplan’s views for
explanation); id. at 844 & n.20 (citing Committee meeting excerpts); id. at 834 n.14 (citing a
letter from Kaplan to another Committee member); 4 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 1029
(noting the respect given the views of individual Committee members).
188 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
189 Id. at R. 23(b)(3), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
190 More recent commentary added to Rule 23(b)(3) states that “[f]ollowing a determination of
liability, for example, proceedings to define the remedy may demonstrate the need to amend the
class definition or subdivide the class.” Id. at R. 23(c), advisory committee’s notes to 2003
amendment. This description is unhelpful in resolving the proper role for subclasses, for it
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Committee’s Notes could be read to undermine the support for the
replacement theory.
However, this reading relies on the tenuous inference that the
Committee did not discuss the issue in more depth because it did not
accept the replacement theory. The Committee could have declined to
discuss Rule 23(c)(4)(B) in that portion of the commentary for any
number of reasons, including for the reason that it wished to focus on
the meaning of Rule 23(b)(3), not Rule 23(c)(4). In addition, a similar
inferential argument could be made in support of the replacement
theory: if the text supports the replacement theory but the Committee
did not, one would have expected the Committee to have clarified Rule
23(c)(4)(B) by stating that subclasses should not be considered unless
the entire action could be maintained under Rule 23(b)(3).
On balance, the Advisory Committee’s Notes provide some
support for the replacement theory, but only because they confirm the
textual interpretation.
2.

Rules Committee Drafting Record

Despite the volume of drafting history primary source materials
kept on file at the Rules Committee Support Office,191 clues from the
drafting history are nearly as sparse. The drafters spoke little of the
subclassing section. The only discussions I have found that pertain
specifically to the subclassing language occur during some of the very
first comments on the new section.
In the most prominent discussion of Rule 23(c)(4), Professor
Charles Alan Wright wrote to Reporter Benjamin Kaplan, complaining
that Rule 23(c)(4) “seems to me the kind of picky detail which does not
require statement in the rule” and questioning whether the provision
was in accordance with the law, although he did not elaborate as to
why.192 Responding, Kaplan and Committee Member Albert M. Sacks
wrote:

appears to assume that the class has already been certified.
191 These materials are available on microfiche at the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
in Washington, D.C. Fortunately, many that I reference here have been appended to an article by
Professor Laura Hines. See Hines, End-Run, supra note 7, at 765-70. For convenience, I add a
citation to her article for these primary source materials where appropriate.
192 See Letter from Prof. Charles Alan Wright to Benjamin Kaplan, at 3 (Mar. 30, 1963),
reprinted in COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1935-88, CONGRESSIONAL
INFORMATION SERVICE RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, No. CI-7001, at 41
[hereinafter U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, No. CI-7001]; see also Hines, End-Run, supra note 7,
at 765-66.
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Certainly it is the law: . . . the reality of the class-subclass situation is
manifested when courts, speaking of inadequacy of representation,
observe that besides the interests shared by all members of the class,
there are special interests shared only by particular groupings within
the class. We think [the subclassing provision], although making
obvious points, is useful for the sake of clarity and completeness.193

Upon receiving that response, Professor Wright withdrew his objection
and accepted Kaplan’s assertion that the subclassing provision language
accurately reflected existing law, although he noted that he still
harbored lingering (if unexplained) doubts.194
Kaplan’s example illustrates the quintessential subclassing
problem—adequacy of representation—and suggests that subclassing
can isolate those subgroups with different interests in order to provide
effective representation for them. The contingency and replacement
theories are not concerned with this power of subclassing.
Thus, one plausible interpretation of this brief dialogue is that
Kaplan’s example illustrates just one of the most common ways the
subclassing provision can be effective but by no means is indicative of
any limitations on the provision. Kaplan does not go so far as to
suggest that the subclassing provision cannot save a global class if it
failed other class requirements.
Indeed, in a later article, Kaplan lauded the broad power of judicial
initiative to find creative solutions to class questions, stating:
The reform of Rule 23 was intended to shake the law of class actions
free of abstract categories . . . and to rebuild the law on functional
lines responsive to those recurrent life patterns which call for mass
litigation through representative parties . . . . And whereas the old
Rule had paid virtually no attention to the practical administration of
193 See Memorandum from Benjamin Kaplan to the Chairman and Members of the Committee
(Sept. 12, 1963), reprinted in U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, No. CI-7001, supra note 192, at 52;
see also Hines, End-Run, supra note 7, at 766-68. In the only other elaboration of subclassing
that I could find in the annals, Kaplan wrote: “Then we have a further provision about the
division of classes into sub-classes, which looks to the proper conduct of the suit. You may have
a group of people who are aligned in interest as to certain matters, but may split up as to others,
and in such a case, one can speak properly of classes and sub-classes.” Transcript of Civil Rules
Advisory Committee Meeting, Amendment Proposal EE—Class Actions, reprinted in
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1935-88, CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION
SERVICE RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, No. CI-7104, at 53 [hereinafter U.S.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, No. CI-7104] (remarks of Reporter Benjamin Kaplan); see also Hines,
End-Run, supra note 7, at 768-69.
194 See Letter from Prof. Charles Alan Wright to Benjamin Kaplan, at 4 (Sept. 23, 1963),
reprinted in COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1935-88, CONGRESSIONAL
INFORMATION SERVICE RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, No. CI-7002, at 17 (“I
withdraw my objection to Rule 23(c)[(4)]. When Ben Kaplan and Al Sacks tell me that ‘certainly
it is the law,’ that settles that it is indeed the law, and I rue my own ignorance in having earlier
expressed doubt. . . . Despite what you now say, I remain in dubitante about 23(c)[(4)] . . . .”);
see also Hines, End-Run, supra note 7, at 768.
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class actions, the revised Rule dwelt long on this matter—not, to be
sure, by prescribing detailed procedures, but by confirming the
courts’ broad powers and inviting judicial initiative.195

Though he did not mention Rule 23(c)(4) specifically in this passage,
such sentiments suggest that courts can use such management
provisions broadly and in ways that would support the replacement
theory.
In addition, Professor Wright’s treatise on civil procedure adopts a
similarly broad view of Rule 23 and, in fact, advocates the replacement
theory.196 This would suggest that Professor Wright ultimately
understood both Kaplan to mean and the law to be that courts could
subdivide uncertifiable classes and just address certification of the
subclasses.
On the other hand, Kaplan, in his discussion with Professor
Wright, explicitly referred to a global class that had already satisfied the
commonality test. If Kaplan envisioned a subclassing mechanism that
could replace the global class with smaller subclasses, the fact that the
global class satisfied the commonality test would be irrelevant. Because
he mentioned it, one could argue that Kaplan believed it necessary that
the global class at least meet the commonality requirement for the
subclassing mechanism to provide relief.
Also, what seems abundantly clear is that Kaplan and the
Committee Members agreed that the subclassing provision was
somewhat “obvious” and merely a “detail.”197 Even in his later
writings, when Kaplan explicated the new Rule 23 in some detail, he
devoted nothing more than a passing footnote to Rule 23(c)(4).198 If the
drafters considered Rule 23(c)(4)(B) to encompass the replacement
theory, one might expect to find discussion of subclassing far more
extensive and characterization of subclassing as something far more
powerful than a “detail” in the drafting history.199
As argued above, however, this line of inferential reasoning is
somewhat uncertain, and I am hesitant to credit it in light of the other
evidence supporting the replacement theory. On balance, the most that
can be said about the dialogue between Kaplan and Wright during the
195
196

Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 497 (1969).
7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 1778, at 546 (suggesting that subclassing could make
the common issues in the subdivided class action predominate for the purposes of Rule 23(b)(3)).
197 Transcript of Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meeting, Amendment Proposal EE—Class
Actions, reprinted in U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, No. CI-7104, supra note193, at 53 (remarks of
Reporter Benjamin Kaplan); Letter from Prof. Charles Alan Wright to Benjamin Kaplan, at 3
(Mar. 30, 1963), reprinted in U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, No. CI-7001, supra note 192, at 41;
see also Hines, End-Run, supra note 7, at 765-66, 768-69.
198 Kaplan, supra note 30, at 393 n.144.
199 Cf. Hines, End-Run, supra note 7, at 754 (making the same argument for the Advisory
Committee Notes and Rule 23(c)(4)(A)).
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drafting committee’s work on Rule 23 is that it sheds little light on the
proper meaning or role of subclassing.
E.

Efficiency and Workability

As with the interpretation of the drafting history, the effects of the
two competing interpretations on the efficiency200 and workability of
class actions do not strongly support either theory. Take the following
scenario, for example. Plaintiff seeks the broadest class possible. At
certification, Plaintiff acknowledges that his global class cannot meet
the Rule 23 requirements with or without subclasses, but argues that the
class should be subdivided into subclasses A, B, and C, which each
independently satisfy Rule 23. If a court follows the replacement
theory, it will certify subclasses A, B, and C, and the case will proceed
in the same scope that Plaintiff initially sought, albeit in three chunks.
If, however, a court follows the contingency theory, it will refuse to
certify any class and proceed only with Plaintiff’s individual claims.
Non-certification, however, does not prevent different plaintiffs from
simply refiling three independent class actions equivalent in scope to
the subclasses A, B, and C. Indeed, if the joinder rules permit it, the
original Plaintiff could simply amend his complaint to allege three
different classes rather than filing separate class actions.
Advocates of the replacement theory could answer that efficiency
and workability are hindered by the result caused by the contingency
theory because the class must start all over again with considerable
repetition of time, expense, and effort. Parties to a class action may,
and generally do, seek some discovery prior to certification, which can
be costly and time consuming. In addition, the presiding judge develops
some familiarity with the factual and legal issues, parties, and attorneys
involved. Under the contingency theory, discovery would have to begin
anew, possibly before a different judge (or multiple different judges, if
one or more of the three new actions is assigned to a different judge)
who knows nothing about the case or the individuals involved. Certain
factual or legal issues resolved or argued prior to certification may have
to be relitigated. And, finally, because certification is often a highly
contentious issue, the time between filing and a certification decision
could span several years and cost enormous sums of money on both
sides. In such cases, some plaintiffs may have a statute of limitations
problem, or they may no longer be willing (or able) to be class
members. A replacement theorist would argue that these costs to
200 See Rubenstein, supra note 44, at 434 (citing efficiency as the “primary argument for
aggregation in mass tort cases”).
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efficiency are unnecessary in light of the nearly equivalent end effect of
certification of smaller but multiple classes. Efficiency and costeffectiveness is, after all, what Rule 23 is all about.
Advocates of the contingency theory could respond that the costs
inherent in their theory will cause the plaintiff to evaluate his class more
carefully at the outset. If the class is sustainable only in parts, then the
plaintiff should bring it as such. And, when that happens, economy and
efficiency are furthered by less contentious certification issues. In other
words, the market will right itself and produce the most efficient result.
The problem with this argument is that it may not be feasible for
the plaintiff to know, before any discovery, what the proper scope of the
class action should be. Indeed, class actions are designed to be flexible
so that the proper scope can be developed during the initial stages of the
litigation and then be decided at certification. It is therefore doubtful
that the market will right itself in this case. It is more likely that, if the
contingency theory governed, a very few class plaintiffs would
approximate the proper scope of the class properly, many others would
underestimate the size of the class and exclude otherwise viable claims
out of the fear of failing certification and facing large costs, and many
others would still overestimate the size of their class, even in a good
faith attempt to get the scope right, because they do not possess
sufficient facts to make an accurate determination.
In addition, such a rigid all-or-nothing approach to certification is
contrary to the spirit of flexibility in Rule 23. As I explained above, the
certification process is a give-and-take development of an
understanding of the case and where the Rule 23 boundaries should be
drawn. Rule 23(c)(1) is specifically designed to address class scope
issues after the class is defined and certified and provides for
certification “at an early practicable time” to allow for proper factual
development to ascertain the proper scope of the class after the
complaint is filed.201
A stronger argument for the contingency theory is that the
elimination of the global class from consideration could create a
preposterous combination of subclasses. One can imagine, for example,
the replacement theory extended to its logical conclusion: that any class
could be broken down into thousands, or even millions, of individual
subclasses—each with its own representative, common issues, and legal
counsel—as long as each subclass independently satisfies Rule 23(a)
and Rule 23(b).202 In another direction, one can imagine the
201 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (directing courts to certify “at an early practicable time”); id. at
R. 23(c)(1)(C) (“An order [of certification] may be altered or amended before final judgment.”).
202 As one commentator has suggested, issue classes allow a court to isolate the common
issues for class certification and leave the uncommon issues for individualized litigation so that
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replacement theory generating completely uncommon subclasses if the
global class no longer needs to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality
requirement of one common issue uniting the class. Finally, consider a
gender discrimination action alleging that a tap-on-the-shoulder system
permits illegal gender bias to infect a company’s promotion criteria.203
The replacement theory would support such a claim being brought by
both men and women in the same class—its solution would just be to
create a subclass of men and a subclass of women.
If the global class must still satisfy Rule 23, as the contingency
theory dictates, then a court can easily deny certification of these odd
developments.204 Under the replacement theory, however, one could
argue that a court considers only the certifiability of the subclasses, and
if each independently satisfies Rule 23, then that court should certify
them, irrespective of the manageability problems they cause as a group.
Although these odd situations present an intriguing thought
experiment, I am convinced that courts have tools at their disposal to
ensure that they do not arise in practice. Rule 23(c)(1) allows a court
considerable flexibility in defining and modifying the class.205 In
addition, Rule 23(d) grants a court the power to make appropriate orders
“determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to
prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence
or argument”206 or “imposing conditions on the representative parties or
on intervenors.”207 Also, nothing in Rule 23(b)(3) restricts the
superiority inquiry to so narrow a focus as the particular class or
subclass under scrutiny without consideration to other related cases or
classes that may affect the maintainability or integrity of the class at
issue. Finally, Rule 23(c)(4)(B) itself grants courts authority to subclass
only “when appropriate,” and even then the court “may”—but need
the “issue class” will always satisfy commonality and predominance. See Shapiro, supra note 7,
at 958.
203 See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
204 For example, the court could hold that too many subclasses make the global class
unmanageable under Rule 23(b)(3). See Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177,
189 (4th Cir. 1993) (reversing a certification of a class with causes of action arising under several
different states’ laws and rejecting the district court’s attempt to create subclasses by state
because the subclasses would “pose management difficulties and reduce the judicial efficiency
sought to be achieved through certification”); MANUAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 7, §
21.23, at 340-41 states:
The creation of a number of subclasses may . . . make the case unmanageable, or, in a
Rule 23(b)(3) suit, may defeat the superiority requirement. Denial of class status in
such circumstances is appropriate; if conflicts and differences among class members
are so sharp that a number of small subclasses result, class treatment may not be
justified in the first place.
205 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).
206 Id. at R. 23(d)(1).
207 Id. at R. 23(d)(3).
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not—subclass.208 In short, even if these horribles were ever to parade
before a court, it would have the means to deal with them.209
In sum, therefore, efficiency and workability supports the
replacement theory.
F.

Supreme Court

As I discussed above, the Supreme Court has not resolved the
conflict between the two theories of subclassing. However, a close
analysis of one of the cases I discussed above does provide some
support for the contingency theory, and I feel obliged to address it.
In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,210 the Supreme Court
reversed certification of the settlement class because it failed to meet the
adequacy and predominance requirements of Rule 23. In discussing the
deficiency of representation, the Court several times alluded to the lack
of subclasses,211 suggesting that, in the Court’s view, Rule 23(c)(4)(B)
could have helped the class overcome its divergences to satisfy Rule
23(a)(4).212
In contrast to its discussion on adequacy, however, the Court did
not opine on subclasses in the context of the predominance deficiency.
The Court merely stated: “Given the greater number of questions
peculiar to the several categories of class members, and to individuals
within each category, and the significance of those uncommon
questions, any overarching dispute about the health consequences of
asbestos exposure cannot satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
standard.”213 The Court did not consider whether subclasses could have
remedied the predominance problem by, for example, isolating
disparate interests to permit commonality to predominate within each
subgroup individually. The Court’s failure to suggest subclasses in this
instance, when considered in light of its suggestion that subclasses
208
209
210
211

Id. at R. 23(c)(4).
Rule 23 could benefit from clarification on this point, however.
521 U.S. 591 (1997).
Id. at 626 (stating that “named parties with diverse medical conditions sought to act on
behalf of a single giant class rather than on behalf of discrete subclasses”); id. at 627 (“Although
the named parties alleged a range of complaints, each served generally as representative for the
whole, not for a separate constituency.”); id. (“‘Where differences among members of a class are
such that subclasses must be established, we know of no authority that permits a court to approve
a settlement without creating subclasses on the basis of consents by members of a unitary class,
some of whom happen to be members of the distinct subgroups.’”) (quoting In re Joint E. & S.
Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1992)).
212 Id. at 626-27. The dissent appeared to agree. Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“These
differences might warrant subclasses, though subclasses can have problems of their own.”).
213 Id. at 624.
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could aid typicality, could imply that the Court did not believe that
subclassing could remedy the predominance problems. This part of
Amchem could support, inferentially, the contingency theory.
Additional support for the contingency theory comes from the
Court’s discussion of Rule 23(e). In rejecting the argument that Rule
23(e) provides an independent mechanism for certifying classes for
settlement purposes if the settlement is “fair,” the Court reasoned that
Rule 23(e), unlike Rule 23(a) and (b), was not designed to assure class
cohesion.214 Rule 23(e), instead, was designed as an additional
requirement, not a superseding one.215 Although Amchem did not make
the analogy, one could argue that Rule 23(c)(4) operates the same way:
that Rule 23(c)(4), placed outside of the certification requirement
sections of Rule 23(a) and (b), and placed instead among the
housekeeping sections of Rule 23, is no substitute for Rule 23(a) and (b)
compliance but rather is an additional requirement that can be
implemented only when Rule 23(a) and (b) have been met.
But the Court could have failed to mention subclasses in the
predominance discussion for any number of reasons, and the Court did
not itself draw any analogy between Rule 23(e) and Rule 23(c).216
Thus, my response to these arguments is that they are interpretations of
Supreme Court language from a case that does not primarily focus on
Rule 23(c)(4) and that until the Court provides more than this tangential
guidance, the text of the Rule and the other support for the replacement
theory should prevail.
CONCLUSION
Subclassing and certification are topics whose paths are likely to
cross more and more in the near future. In this Article, I have attempted
to show that the current body of law and commentary is unsettled on
whether subclasses can completely replace consideration of the global
class or whether subclasses can only be certified if the global class is
also certified. I have also attempted to demonstrate that the best
interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)(B)—as written, and under the current
Supreme Court precedent and prevailing circuit sentiment—is the
replacement theory. I have done so while making the strongest
214
215
216

Id. at 620-21, 623.
Id. at 620-21.
Though I find them too tangential to this Article to address them in significant depth, there
are good reasons to resist analogizing Rule 23(e) to Rule 23(c) in this instance. For example,
Rule 23(e)(1) restricts the power of the court to approve a class settlement, whereas Rule 23(c)(4)
grants the court the power to subclass.
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arguments for the contingency theory along the way. I do not believe
that these arguments are so easily dismissed. Indeed, they have much to
commend them. They are, in my opinion, strong enough to call into
doubt the certainty of the replacement theory as the correct
interpretation (although I think, for all of the reasons stated above, that
it is the best interpretation).
In light of that, I would be remiss not to address two issues that the
replacement theory may implicate with the new Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, or CAFA.217 Because CAFA is so new, its substantive
provisions have been examined too infrequently to make this a detailed
analysis, so I include this brief discussion only in my concluding
thoughts and leave a deeper analysis for another day.
First, CAFA was enacted partly in the hope that fewer class actions
would survive in federal court.218 The replacement theory is thus in
some tension with the spirit of CAFA because it provides federal courts
with more tools to retain large class actions. Second, CAFA provides
for diversity jurisdiction if the total amount in controversy exceeds $5
million,219 whereas prior to CAFA, some federal courts required each
class member to satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy
jurisdictional limit.220 Under the replacement theory, in which the
global class is disregarded and the case proceeds with just multiple
subclasses, it is unclear whether the CAFA $5 million jurisdictional
limit would apply to the uncertified global class or would be required of
each subclass individually. The replacement theory may then cause
some confusion in the applicability of CAFA’s amount-in-controversy
requirement.
These tensions with CAFA may come to a head in the near future,
and it is unclear how they will be resolved. My hope is that this article
will be a call for further discussion on these issues and, ultimately,
clarification by the Rules Committee or the Supreme Court. Until then,
I believe that, for better or for worse, the replacement theory is the
proper interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)(B).
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Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at (2005) (stating that state court “judges have reputations for
readily certifying classes”).
219 Class Action Fairness Act § 4(d)(2).
220 See, e.g., Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2000); Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999); Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631 (10th
Cir. 1998); see also Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). But see Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc.,
263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that only the named plaintiff need satisfy the jurisdictional
amount); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (same); Gibson
v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); Stromberg Metal Works Inc. v. Press
Mech. Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir.
1995) (same).

